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The value of a statistical life (VSL) plays the central role in regulatory decisions affecting risks to life and health. Economists continue to try to improve the accuracy and concomitant usefulness of benefit assessments by examining whether the typically calculated VSL understates the average benefits of life-saving government regulations and whether the heterogeneity in individual VSLs should influence policy. Here we examine empirically the importance of two possible omitted variables that could affect the estimates of VSL based on the typical wage equation, relative position in the wage distribution and relative age within the life-cycle pattern of consumption. We find that ignoring the worker's relative position in the wage distribution does not affect VSL as conventionally computed, but that ignoring workers' planned consumption undervalues VSL by perhaps 20 percent.
Our results have implications for the economic understanding of the compensating wage differential process as well as for policy. The modest effect of adding measures of relative economic position to the canonical hedonic wage regression suggests that workers taking risky jobs make their decisions based on their personal wage-risk tradeoff rather than their status or relative economic position. In contrast, the worker's relative position within the personal life cycle pattern of consumption is a driving force that affects the temporal trajectory of VSLs over the life cycle and is a promising way to consider distributional consequences of policy simply. Appropriate VSL assessments should not downweight the risks to older citizens compared to the young because the effect of age on the level of planned consumption may outweigh or dampen the effect of age in shortening people's remaining future lifetimes.
I. The Canonical Hedonic Wage Regression and Implied VSL
The canonical hedonic wage equation used in the value of statistical life calculations takes the form
where for worker i in industry j and occupation k, ln(w) is the natural logarithm of the hourly wage rate, fatal is the work-related fatality rate, and X is a vector containing both demographic variables (such as education, race, marital status, and union membership) and job characteristic variables (such as the non-fatal injury risk, possibly wage replacement under workers' compensation insurance, and possibly industry, occupation, or geographic location indicators). Finally, u ijk is an error term that may exhibit conditional heteroskedasticity and within fatality risk autocorrelation, which need be reflected in the coefficients' calculated standard errors.
With a fatality risk measure expressed as deaths per 100,000 workers and a typical work year of 2000 hours, the value of a statistical life is VSL = α × exp(ln(w)) × 100,000 × 2000. Although the VSL function depends on the values of the right-hand side in (1), most commonly considered is the mean VSL.
The fatality risk measure we use in our regressions is the fatality rate for the worker's industry-occupation group. Workplace fatality risk is publicly available only by industry. To provide a more precise correspondence between the fatality risk and the worker's job, we constructed the fatality risk using unpublished U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics data from the Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI), which is the most comprehensive inventory available of work-related deaths.
1 The number of fatalities in each industry-occupation cell is the numerator of the fatality risk measure, and the number of employees in the industry-occupation group is the denominator of the fatality risk measure.
By way of additional detail, we considered 720 industry-occupation groups, which are the intersection of 72 two-digit SIC code industries and the 10 one-digit occupation groups. For the 6,238 total work-related deaths in 1997 there were 290 industry occupation cells with no reported fatalities. Because total fatalities were relatively similar from 1992, which was the first year of the CFOI, up through our regression sample year of 1997, we used the mean fatalities for an industry-occupation cell during 1992-1997 when computing fatality risk. Intertemporally averaging reduces the importance of random changes in fatalities and reduces by two-thirds the number of empty fatality risk cells. In our data the average fatality risk is 4/100,000 with the lowest risk level 0.6/100,000 and the highest about 25/100,000.
In addition to the fatality risk variable just described we estimate the regression in
(1) with individual data from the 1997 merged outgoing rotation group of the Current Population Survey. Sample individuals are non-agricultural full-time workers (usual weekly hours worked at least 35) between the ages of 18 and 65. As reported in Table 1, the VSL from our baseline regression is $4.7-4.8 million, with the upper range from the men only sample.
II. Relative Position and VSL
Workers' expected utility depends on the job risk and their absolute wage, but may also depend on their relative position within the wage distribution (Robert Frank and Cass Sunstein, 2001 ). Equilibrium market outcomes will then reflect workers' concerns with relative position too. If compensating differentials for risk raise workers' income and relative economic position matters, a worker might be willing to accept a lower compensating differential for a given risk than if there were no such relative position effects. The consequence for the computation and application of VSL estimates is that standard VSL estimates are too low because relative position is an omitted variable in the typical hedonic wage equation.
Our amendment of the canonical model to include relative position effects is
where R is the individual's relative position in the wage distribution of some reference group. Equation (1) is the possibly mis-specified model, and equation (2) may be the correctly specified model. If Frank and Sunstein are correct, a worker will accept a smaller compensating differential for risk to boost the worker's relevant relative wage, so
. Ignoring relative position may undervalue safety enhancing government regulations that do not disturb relative wages, which are properly measured by VSL(α 2 ) compared to regulations that alter relative wages, as measured by
Elsewhere we have offered a lengthy conceptual criticism of the importance of relative position including that it is unlikely a regulation could ever have no distribution effects (Thomas J. Kniesner and W. Kip Viscusi 2003) . Even if relative position effects exist, they seem likely to be small. A worker facing the average fatality risk of 4/100,000
and with the VSL of $4.74 million from Here we consider some potential reference groups to see if group effects when implemented in a regression framework enlarge the VSL. We consider as possible omitted regressors in the canonical model in (1) the relative position (percentile rank) of a person's wage in the state of residence and the relative position of a person's wage among persons of the same gender in the state of residence. 3 We construct the relative position variable such that the highest wage person has the lowest wage rank variable score, or R = 1 = first is best, and R = group size = last is worst.
The results in Table 1 148-149). Thus, α 1 > α 2 ⇔ φ × (∂fatal/∂R|X) > 0. In the estimates of equation (2) in Table 1 φ < 0, which simply reflects that relatively high-wage workers also have high absolute wages (remember that R = 1 is the highest wage rank). Many persons with relatively high wages in their state are also live in higher average fatality rate states, so that (∂fatal/∂R|X) < 0. Because both terms in the product that determines the change in the coefficient of fatal injury risk are negative, VSL shrinks when relative position is added to the baseline regression in Table 1 .
Including the interaction of the rank variable does not lead to more favorable effects for the relative position hypothesis. The interaction term is not statistically significant for the ranks by state and, although the interaction term is statistically significant for rankings by state and gender, including the wage rank-fatality risk interaction reduces the implied VSL.
position. The state level seems to strike the best balance among possible reference groups. We tried several reference group alternatives, including age-education as suggested in Isolde Woittiez and Arie Kapteyn (1998) , and no other reference group rankings yielded significant regression coefficients in (2).
As least for the measures of relative position we can consider, using conventionally computed estimates of VSL based on the canonical hedonic wage regression ignoring relative position do not undervalue possible safety enhancing government regulations leave relative economic position unchanged.
III. Consumption and VSL
Elsewhere we consider in detail the fact that VSL should be computed in light of the worker's consumption plans over the life cycle (Thomas J. Kniesner, W. Kip Viscusi, and James P. Ziliak 2004) . Someone with a given life expectancy will have a higher VSL if he or she has back loaded planned consumption than an otherwise identical person whose planned consumption has already occurred (Donald Shepard and Richard Zeckhauser 1984; Per-Olov Johansson 2002a , 2002b . Adding consumption plans to a model of the worker's behavior is also a natural way to capture most completely the effects of aging on VSL, which need not be monotonic with age if consumption is sufficiently increasing or non-monotonic with age.
The hedonic model we estimate that adds consumption to the canonical model of
where C is a measure of the individual's consumption. Because persons with higher intended consumption should also have higher paying jobs one expects δ > 0 in (3). If persons with more planned consumption are wealthier and choose safer jobs, ceteris paribus, C and fatal conditionally covary negatively (∂fatal/∂C|X < 0). According to the formula we discussed earlier for how adding a variable will change the coefficient of fatal, it should be the case that α 3 > α 1 ⇒ VSL(α 3 ) > VSL(α 1 ), and a model that includes consumption effects has a higher implied value of a statistical life for older workers than if the researcher ignores planned consumption.
The CPS data used in Table 1 do not include data on consumption. Examining the change in VSL from adding consumption requires using a second source of data on individual labor market participants. We use the 1997 wave of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, which also provides individual level data on wages, consumption, industry and occupation, and demographics.
Concerning consumption, the PSID records food expenditures (inclusive of food stamps) both inside and outside the home and housing expenditures including rent or mortgage payments where applicable. One measure of C we use in (3) is what the PSID makes readily available, which is the sum of food and housing expenditures. We also imputed total consumption as disposable income net of saving (Ziliak 1998 ).
Because consumption is a choice variable we allow for E[u ijk C i ] ≠ 0, which implies the need for an instrumental variables approach to produce a consistent estimate of α 3 , the estimated fatality effect in model (3), to use in calculating VSL. Although choosing an instrument set is always problematic in IV models, here we rely on relatively standard information from economic theory of individual behavior over the life cycle.
Based on human capital theory we take the worker's non-wage income as having no direct effect on the log of the wage, and based on the theory of the consumer we take non-wage income as determining consumption.
The results in Table 2 using the PSID parallel the results in Table 1 using the CPS. We present results with consumption endogeneity treated by instrumenting with non-wage income as the identifying regressor. 4 The result of interest is that including consumption raises the coefficient of fatality and its P-value. Adding consumption to the canonical hedonic wage model raises the average VSL by as much as 20 percent.
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IV. Discussion
Economists and policymakers continue to search for the most appropriate VSL estimate for evaluating the benefits of government regulations. Are current estimates too low, leading us to undervalue the net benefits of health and safety regulations? Or, in the case of policies affecting older age groups, are the assumed benefits too high? Here we examine two possible additional variables in the typical hedonic wage function used to produce value of a statistical life estimates: relative economic position in the worker's reference group and relative age as it pertains to the life cycle of intended consumption.
Either variable could be an important addition because it could increase the coefficient of fatality risk and the VSL it implies.
One additional reason why relative position is an interesting variable to Frank and Sunstein (2001) is that it is a simple way to introduce distributional concerns into costeffectiveness calculations. VSL computed from a hedonic wage regression with relative economic position as a regressor holds constant a measure of the distributional consequences of a regulation that changes fatality risk. Holding relative economic position constant could allow the analyst to avoid having to address issues of distribution 4 Other independent variables in the first-stage IV regression for consumption are a quadratic in age, fatality risk, education, race, marital status, union status, one-digit occupation, and region of residence. Non-labor income is statistically significant at the 0.01 level and R 2 = 0.3. 5 Note that average VSL is much higher when estimated from labor market data of the PSID, which may be the result of the particular set of workers in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. The relatively high VSL in the PSID is well known (John Garen 1988, Michael Moore and W. Kip Viscusi 1990 ) and does not concern us here as we are interested in how including consumption changes the VSL estimate. Note that the general shape of the variation of VSL with age using the PSID is similar to that obtained using the CPS except that the level of VSL is greater. Unfortunately, the CPS does not include consumption data. more generally, which can prove highly controversial or lead to strategic manipulation of cost-effectiveness calculations (Sunstein 2004 , Viscusi 2000 . However, the level of VSL is the main effect of interest, and we find that introducing relative wage position into the canonical hedonic regression if anything lowers, not raises, VSL.
We agree that there is no unique measure of relative position, such that wage percentile within a state or within a state by gender might not be the typical worker's reference group. However, we have explored alternatives that are less aggregative and found a lack of statistical significance, and our reference group results for a hedonic wage function are the possibly the first attempt to examine the importance of relative position in a hedonic wage function. The main policy implication of our results concerning relative position is that, as typically computed, VSL is not undervalued by ignoring a worker's relative position in the wage distribution.
The conclusion and ultimate policy implication are reversed when one considers that worker's wages are jointly determined with consumption plans. The consequence is that VSL is explicitly a function of the individual's consumption. We have demonstrated that consumption is a significant additional variable in hedonic models used to produce, VSL and that incorporating consumption raises VSL by as much as 20 percent, most notably for middle-aged and older workers Because consumption need be treated as endogenous, the most obvious instrument for consumption is non-wage income, or the return on financial wealth. The estimated coefficient of fatality risk holds constant wealth implicitly in the models of Table 2 so that the results also are net of distributional effects.
If one wants to net out distributional consequences of policies that affect mortality risk the most transparent way, looking at the effect of policy for workers of a given wealth level could be the best approach. Because consumption changes with age, models that include consumption are a natural way to infer how VSL changes with age, which need not be monotonic if workers have back loaded their planned consumption (Kniesner, Viscusi, and Ziliak 2004) . NOTE: The sample consists of male heads of household age 18 to 65 in 1997 who are not students, permanently disabled, or institutionalized, who have worked for wages in the past year, whose hourly wage rate is between $2 and $100 per hour, and whose food and housing expenditure is less than $100,000. All regressions control for the education, race, marital status, union status, one-digit occupation, and region of residence of the head. The standard errors are adjusted for conditional heteroskedasticity and within fatality-risk cluster autocorrelation. SOURCE: Kniesner, Viscusi, and Ziliak (2004) .
